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VALUING DIFFERENCE, EXERCISING 






One cannot say that the people of Oz valued difference or valued the 
diversity of its people, because in Oz, difference and diversity simply were; 
difference and diversity simply existed.1 It might be more accurate to say 
that the people in the fairy land of Oz had a practice of difference in which 
different people or beings of all sorts were simply accepted and embraced. 
Not just accepted, as in tolerated in the way someone from Kansas or the 
greater United States might understand it, but difference in Oz was inherent 
in the place, it was expected—respected—promoted—taken for granted—
embraced—sometimes celebrated—but rarely condemned or rejected.2 This 
practice of difference informed and was informed by a theory. But the 
theory was not a theory about the value of difference or the value of a 
diverse society. Rather, this practice was informed by a theory, philosophy, 
and ethic of care: care for all sentient beings.3 
In the United States, by contrast, the rhetoric of diversity is 
everywhere. That is, all sorts of people can be heard to say that they value 
difference, or that they value diversity.
4
 This rhetoric, for instance, is 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, University at Buffalo, School of Law. This piece is dedicated to my sister, Laurie 
Harris Daniel, who told me that she liked the premise of this piece but felt that I needed to write clearer! 
In addition, with Zanita in spirit, and the ethic of care in mind, I‘d like to dedicate this piece to the 
sibling relationship of sisterhood. It is a wonderful relation. 
1 L. Frank Baum wrote fifteen books about the Marvelous Land of Oz all of which are reprinted in THE 
COMPLETE BOOK OF OZ: 15-IN-1 OMNIBUS (2007). The majority of people are most familiar with the 
first book, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, originally published in 1900. Id. at 5. This is so because the 
first book was adapted into the famous movie production, THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
1939).  
2 Oz did not start out as a story about a utopia. Rather it began as a ―wonderful, magic-filled 
country . . . but it was not an ideal society.‖ KATHARINE M. ROGERS, L. FRANK BAUM: CREATOR OF Oz 
168 (2002). Consider that in the first book both the Munchkins and the Winkies are enslaved. However, 
by the fifth book The Road to Oz, in which the shaggy man appears and in which this Article is 
concerned, the Land of Oz had developed into an ideal society. L. FRANK BAUM, THE ROAD TO OZ 
(1909), reprinted in L. FRANK BAUM , THE COMPLETE BOOK OF OZ: 15-IN-1 OMNIBUS 213–64 (2007).  
3 Here I am using the term to include all those who are capable of experiencing pleasure. As such it 
would include animals. 
4 See, e.g., SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER 
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (Princeton Univ. Press 2007) (explaining how different 
views and diversity lead to better decisions and outcomes); Andra M. Voyer, Living Difference, Talking 
Diversity, (Aug. 11, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/5/3/0/p105308_index.html 
(discussing the limitations and difficulties of the discourse of diversity); Caryl M. Stern-LaRosa, 
Talking to Children about Diversity; Preschool Years, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (2001), 
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bantered around in the context of identity politics—from references to 
racial and sexual minorities to those disadvantaged by gender or physical 
and mental ability.5 It also features in conversations about the historical 
value of immigrants—if they come from the right place and if they 
assimilate, not just by simply internalizing some overriding value system 
but also by becoming mini replicas of those already here.6 This rhetoric of 
diversity rises in response to a history of elite white domination,7 where 
difference from the norm of white privilege and control is oppressed and 
stigmatized. And it is the continuing normativity of whiteness and white 
domination as well as the actual near monopoly of access to and control 
over the country‘s resources by the white elite—who are determined to 
keep things this way—that renders the rhetoric and practice of diversity at 
best superficial while hindering the full participation of those seen as 
different. 
Take for instance, Justice O‘Connor‘s decision on behalf of the Court 
in Grutter v. Bollinger.8 Justice O‘Connor held that the University of 
Michigan‘s admission policy of factoring in the race of admissions 
applicants for the purposes of constructing a diverse class in the higher 
education context is both a compelling state interest and is narrowly 
tailored to pass constitutional muster under equal protection.9 But Justice 
O‘Connor stipulated that in twenty-five years it should no longer be 
necessary to facilitate diversity through race-conscious means.10 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.adl.org/issue_education/hateprejudice/Prejudice3.asp (discussing the ways in which 
preschoolers can be taught tolerance); James A. Barnes, Obama’s Team: The Face of Diversity, NAT‘L J. 
MAG. (June 20, 2009), http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20090620_3869.php (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2010) (discussing the diversity in the Obama‘s administration). 
5 Also consider the range of statues implemented to ban discrimination and thereby promote inclusivity. 
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (prohibiting discrimination based on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, among other things.); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (prohibiting under certain circumstances discrimination based on 
disability); The Murphy Amendment, 156 Cong. Rec. H. 4025 (May 27, 2010) (repealing, if enacted, 
the ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖ policy, which prohibits the United States military from seeking to discover 
the sexual orientation of those thought to be gay, lesbian, or bisexual and prohibits open gay, lesbian, or 
bisexuals from serving in the U.S. military).  
6 See, e.g., PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, DAY OF RECKONING: HOW HUBRIS, IDEOLOGY, AND GREED ARE 
TEARING AMERICA APART (St. Martin‘s Press 2007) (arguing that the United States runs the risk of 
disintegration because of policies such as free trade, abortion, and the disbelief in God as well as 
diversity and the invasion from the south of people other than Europeans under current immigration 
policies). Patrick Buchanan states, ―[I]ndeed it seems a truism. To hold together a multiethnic or 
multilingual state, either an authoritarian regime or a dominant ethnoculural core is essential." Id. at 3. 
But see Priscilla Huang, Anchor Babies, Over-Breeders, and the Population Bomb: The Reemergence of 
Nativism and Population Control in Anti-Immigration Policies, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 385 (2008) 
(critiquing anti-immigrant forces as trying to limit the reproductive capacity of immigrant women of 
color and suggesting that the immigration debate is about race); Kevin R. Johnson, Taking Initiative on 
Initiatives: Examining Proposition 209 and Beyond: A Handicapped, Not "Sleeping," Giant: The 
Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latina/o and Immigrant Communities, 96 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1259 (2008) (examining the impact of popular initiatives on Latinos/as and noting that 
―[u]nfortunately, race influences the immigration debate and fuels the popular anti-immigrant 
initiatives . . . it also contributes to the popularity of measures to regulate the use of languages other 
than English); Massimo Calabresi, Is Racism Fueling the Immigration Debate?, TIME MAG. ONLINE 
(May 17, 2006), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1195250,00.html#ixzz0vxhX6zEn. 
7 Elite and White are just two attributes of this dominant class. The leaders, for instance, are also 
overwhelming male. 
8 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
9 Id. at 343. 
10 Id. at 342. 
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Presumably, diversity will be achieved by then without recourse to race-
conscious measures.11  
It is curious, however, that considerations of race, presumably an 
aspect of diversity, should be prohibited in the long run. This prohibition 
potentially limits diversity. Is there no value to racial-ethnic diversity? But 
more telling, in describing the rationale for diversity, is that the Court 
betrayed the hidden norm of whiteness and its concern for those privileged 
and benefited by that normativity.12 This calls into question whether 
diversity is sincerely valued or is simply a tool for maintaining the reality 
of white domination. Further, the Court‘s decision has been critiqued 
because in calling for the non-recognition of race in the long run, the Court 
eliminates a significant tool for drawing attention to and presumably 
challenging the patterns, structures, and relations that limit diversity and 
render all too many spaces overwhelmingly white in the first place: race-
consciousness.13 The likely consequence, as seems true today, is that the 
non-recognition of race will aid in preserving the reality of white 
normativity and domination.  
If these critiques do not speak to the superficiality of the quest for 
diversity in Grutter v. Bollinger, the decision has been further assailed on a 
variety of other fronts. These include, on the one hand, a critique that the 
decision betrays a superficial understanding of the meaning and operation 
of race in the United States14 and therefore can address racial concerns only 
superficially, and on the other hand, a critique in which some scholars 
agree that all racial considerations should be eliminated as factors in 
decision-making and should be replaced with considerations of class,15 an 
alternative that is itself superficial.  
                                                          
11 Id. In fact, Justice O‘Connor suggests that since the decision in University of California v. Bakke in 
1979, the test scores and grades of minorities have increased. Id. Therefore, in twenty-five years there 
should be no need for race-conscious measures. See Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
12 See infra notes 78–90 and accompanying text.  
13 The critique of the non-recognition of race or colorblindness has raged for some thirty years now. In 
fact I argue that the emergence of colorblindness in law helped spur the rise and development of Critical 
Race Theory in the late 1970s and 1980s. See, Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future 
Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 330 (2006). Neal 
Gotanda made one of the clearest, and relatively early statements of this critique in law. See Neil 
Gotanda, A Critique of ―Our Constitution is Color-Blind,‖ 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1991). Many 
others have made similar arguments or expanded upon them. I restate several of them in short form and 
through what I hope is a slightly different lens. See infra notes 98–113 See also MICHAEL K. BROWN ET 
AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY (2003); EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, 
WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2001); EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, 
RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN 
THE UNITED STATES (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2003). 
14 Gotanda, supra note 13. 
15 See, e.g., Geiza Vargas-Vargas, Articles of Ornament and Bric-A-Brac, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
121 (2010); Ronald Roach, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Battle Over Race-Conscious Approaches 
Pushes Idea to the Surface—Affirmative Action Watch, BNET, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KXK/is_9_20/ai_104521292 (last visited Aug. 4, 2010) 
(discussing the Bush administration‘s support for class-based affirmative action programs as race-
neutral means for aiding minorities); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996). The ―class or race‖ debate is even older than the colorblindness v. race 
consciousness debate. In fact the class or race debate is over one hundred years old. See generally infra 
note 81, at 87–132 (discussing the ―class first, race first‖ debate and the contradictions in black 
nationalism and internationalism). Again, I hope I add a small twist to it in talking about it from the 
perspective of the ethic of care. 
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This Article briefly examines the story of the shaggy man in L. Frank 
Baum‘s series of fairytales about the Wonderful Wizard and the Land of 
Oz.16 This Article argues, as against the background of the debates and 
practices of diversity in the United States, that the people of Oz sincerely 
value difference and diversity, even though they do not engage the rhetoric 
of diversity. Instead, they value difference through an ethic of care, a moral 
philosophy developed by feminists long after Baum‘s story was imagined.17 
The Article suggests that, as seen in the story of the shaggy man, racial 
difference may have value for peoples of color. It argues, consistent with 
Ozian ethics of care, that society should recognize, respect, and respond to 
differences in a manner that enables participation, and is in contrast to 
Justice O‘Connor's vision of the future. Some might argue that such a story 
supports Justice O‘Connor‘s instinct that it is not essential to recognize a 
feature in order to capture it as an aspect of diversity. However, the practice 
of an ethic of care in Oz not only requires that difference actually be 
recognized and accepted, but also that society provide for it and include its 
bearers among all others in the full participation of society. Second, 
drawing on ethics‘ aim of assuring that everyone has adequate care, this 
Article explores the issues of class in relation to racial oppression, arguing 
that because the issues are intertwined and related to inadequate resources 
and care, they must be changed together. Finally, the Article suggests that 
the practice of diversity in Oz, though imperfect, is a deeper, richer, and 
more thoroughgoing practice than the practice of diversity in the United 
States. 
The taken for granted acceptance and provision for difference in Oz 
could be examined through a number of Baum‘s fantastic characters. 
Consider the wise and living Scarecrow, or the living and loving Tin Man, 
or the brave but Cowardly Lion, or even Toto, not of Oz, a dog who could 
not talk, at least not in the way that humans do, but who is respected 
nonetheless. Each is a different kind of being who is the beneficiary of the 
care ethic and who is provided for and accepted at face value, both within 
the context of the story and without. This is not so surprising. After all, this 
is a fairy tale. But it is the shaggy man's welcome into Oz and his bid to 
stay and live there that demonstrates that the taken-for-granted acceptance 
and provision of him is a function of the care ethic, and that the care ethic 
is a conscious philosophical position. 
The shaggy man makes his appearance in Baum‘s fifth book entitled 
The Road to Oz.18 Dorothy, the main character from the first book The 
Wonderful Wizard of Oz, meets the shaggy man on a road not far from her 
Kansas home, and ―he is shaggy all right.‖19 In the story, he appears to be 
                                                          
16 See generally BAUM, supra note 2. 
17 See infra Part III. 
18 BAUM, supra note 2. 
19 Though I interpret the shaggy man differently, Baum‘s biographer suggests that ―the ‗shaggy man‘ is 
an Ozian view of a tramp.‖ ROGERS, supra note 2, at 163. And that his appearance ―suggests humorous 
eccentricity rather than poverty or slovenliness.‖ Id. Michael Riley agrees. He suggests that there are no 
indications that the shaggy man is forced to be who he is. Rather his shagginess is simply a reflection of 
his individuality. In fact, he suggests that Hobo or Bum are the wrong words to describe the shaggy 
man. He thinks of him as simply having dropped out; one who cares nothing for money and simply 
wants to wander. MICHAEL O. RILEY, OZ AND BEYOND: THE FANTASY WORLD OF L. FRANK BAUM 153 
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looking for the road to Butterfield and Dorothy offers to show him the 
way.
20
 This journey begins a wondrous series of adventures through venues 
such as Foxville, Dunkiton, a soup kettle in which they are the featured 
meal, and eventually Oz.  
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the shaggy man‘s story. 
Part III examines the recognition in Oz of the shaggy man‘s differences and 
uses society‘s treatment and acceptance of him as a basis for critiquing 
Justice O‘Connor‘s goals and understandings about racial difference in 
Grutter. Part IV analyzes the philosophy of care that drives the Ozian 
response to the shaggy man and then returns to Grutter to explore the 
critiques calling for considerations of class instead of race. It suggests that 
the interlocking features of class and race limit care and participation in the 
United States. Part V concludes the Article by asking whether there are any 
lessons to be learned by taking the story of Oz and the shaggy man 
seriously. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE STORY OF THE SHAGGY MAN 
Dorothy meets the shaggy man on a road right outside of her house.
21
 
At a glance, she realizes that the man is indeed shaggy, ―his clothes were 
shaggy, his boots were shaggy and full of holes and his hair and whiskers 
were shaggy. But his smile was sweet and his eyes were kind.‖22 The 
shaggy man inquires about directions for the road to Butterfield.
23
 Dorothy 
tries to provide him directions, but they are too complicated and the man 
seems too stupid to follow them,24 so she decides to show him the way.  
Dorothy accompanies the shaggy man to the road to Butterfield. But 
once they arrive at the road, she discovers several things, two of which are 
significant. First, she discovers that the shaggy man does not want to go to 
Butterfield. Rather, he wants to avoid the road to Butterfield.25 This is 
because there is a man, he claims, living there who owes him fifteen cents 
and who would want to return it to him even though the shaggy man does 
not want the money back.26 He explains, ―Money . . . makes people proud 
and haughty; I don‘t want to be proud and haughty. All I want is to have 
people love me, and as long as I own the Love Magnet, everyone I meet is 
sure to love me dearly.‖27  
When Dorothy asks what the Love Magnet is, the shaggy man shows 
her a ―bit of metal shaped like a horseshoe [that is] dull and brown, and not 
                                                                                                                                      
(1997). Both Rogers and Riley suggest that the shaggy man is based on James W. Riley‘s poems of 
―Raggedy Man.‖ Id. at 153; ROGERS, supra note 2, at 163. Riley argues that it is this book in particular 
where Oz begins to take shape as an ideal society. RILEY supra note 19, at 153–56. 
20 BAUM, supra note 2, at 215. 
21 Id. at 215. 
22 Id. at 217 (explaining that Dorothy has traveled some distance with the shaggy man and is looking at 
him more closely). 
23 Id. at 215. 
24 Id. at 215 (―‗Dear me!‘ cried Dorothy. ‗I shall have to show you the way, you‘re so stupid. Wait a 
minute till I run in the house and get my sunbonnet.‘‖). 
25 Id. at 217. 
26 Id. at 217. 
27 Id. (emphasis added). 
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very pretty,‖ but seems to work.28 He tells her that an Eskimo gave him the 
magnet and that as soon as the Eskimo gave it away, a bear with no 
conscience ate him.29 
Second, Dorothy discovers that where there had been five roads, one of 
which led to Butterfield, another of which led back to her home, there are 
now seventeen or so.
30
 She recognizes none of them and realizes she is lost. 
After she tries to get home via several different roads, Dorothy agrees to 
accompany the shaggy man down the seventh road because, as the shaggy 
man explains, ―[s]even is a lucky number for little girls named Dorothy.‖31 
Two other people, Button-Bright and Polychrome, the Rainbow‘s 
Daughter,32 join them in their journey as they begin a series of adventures 
that end in Oz at a birthday party for Ozma, the Princess of Oz. 
Their adventures take a turn for the worse when they wander into a 
place called Foxville, a town of talking foxes.
33
 They encounter fox soldiers 
who intend to take the group captive.
34
 But because of the shaggy man‘s 
Love Magnet, the soldiers come to love the shaggy man.
35
 Instead of taking 
the group captive, the fox soldiers take the group to the king, whom 
Button-Bright calls King Dox.
36
 King Dox becomes so enamored with what 
he believes to be Button-Bright‘s intellect that he changes Button-Bright‘s 
head into that of a fox.37 King Dox reasons that Button-Bright‘s real head 
made him seem less wise and too youthful and hid his real cleverness. 
Therefore, he confers on him the wiser head of a fox. When the travelers 
complain, King Dox informs them that he did not have the power to change 
Button-Bright‘s head back to its original state.38 After Dorothy promises to 
try to secure an invitation for King Dox to Princess Ozma‘s big birthday 
party, the travelers are allowed to leave town. 
A similar transformation befalls the shaggy man when the travelers 
continue on the road through a big city called Dunkiton. It was a city of 
talking donkeys, who consider the very definition of donkey to mean 
―clever‖39 and considered Dunkiton to be ―the center of the world‘s highest 
civilization.‖40 When the shaggy man flatters the King Kik-a-bray, 
addressing him as ―most novel and supreme ruler of Dunkiton,‖ and calling 
                                                          
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 BAUM, supra note 2, at 216. 
31 Id. at 217. When Dorothy asks how they might determine the seventh road, the shaggy man explains 
the seventh ―[f]rom where you begin to count.‖ Id.  
32 Button-Bright, a boy a few years younger than Dorothy, with blue eyes, pretty curly blond hair, was 
dressed neatly in a sailor suit. Id. at 218. Polychrome is the Daughter of the Rainbow. Id. at 226. When 
they meet her she is dancing to keep warm on a lonely road. She was pretty, dainty and about the same 
height as Dorothy. Id. 
33 Id. at 220. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 223. 
37 The donkeys seem to have misperceived Button-Bright‘s intellect. When Dorothy and the shaggy man 
meet Button Bright, the only thing Buttom Bright knows is his own name, which his mother called him 
because his father always said he was bright as a button. Id. at 218–19. His answer to most questions is 
―I don‘t know,‖ and he appears to be lost. Id. at 219–19. So, Dorothy and the shaggy man decided to 
take him with them. See id. at 218–19. 
38 Id. at 225. 
39 Id. at 229. 
40 Id. at 230. 
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him the ―cleverest king in all the world,‖ the King is very much pleased, 
undoubtedly influenced by the Love Magnet. The King states that ―[o]nly a 
donkey should be able to use such fine, big words, and [that the shaggy 
man was] too wise and admirable in all ways to be a mere man . . . .‖41 So 
the King bestows on the shaggy man what the King considers ―the greatest 
gift within [his] power—a donkey‘s head.‖42 Unfortunately, like King Dox, 
King Kik-a-bray cannot undo his spell. He informs the shaggy man, 
however, that a dive into the Truth Pond, located somewhere in the Land of 
Oz, could reverse the spell, information that leads the group to set their 
travel sights squarely on Oz.
43
 
The group has a series of other adventures before they make it to Oz.44 
Upon reaching Oz, however, they quickly find the Truth Pond into which 




Thereafter, the shaggy man, Button-Bright, and Polychrome begin to 
meet all sorts of the different kinds of beings that inhabit Oz (some of 





 a machine that thinks, talks and acts, but is not 
alive per se. Then the group travels and meets the Tin Man, a living man 
made of tin; Jack Pumkinhead, a living man made of wood with a pumpkin 
head that periodically rots and needs to be replaced; the Saw Horse, a 
living wooden horse; Mr. H. M. Woggle-Bug, T.E., a highly magnified, 
thoroughly educated large, talking bug.
48
 The group also hears about a blue 
bear rug that is alive and causes mischief and the group is picked up and 
driven to the Emerald city by a ―splendid golden chariot,‖ which is drawn 
by two talking beasts, the Cowardly Lion and the Hungry Tiger. The latter 




Now the shaggy man ―might have been afraid if he had met the beasts 
alone, or in any other country; but so many were the marvels in the Land of 
Oz that he was no longer easily surprised . . . .‖50 Nevertheless, the shaggy 
man ―was fairly astounded at what he saw‖ when he reached the Emerald 
City: 
[F]or the graceful and handsome buildings were covered with 
plates of gold and set with emeralds so splendid and valuable that 
                                                          
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 231. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 233–40. Thereafter they met a man who made music by simply breathing, the Musicker. Id. at 
233. They were beaten and placed in a soup kettle to become a meal for the Scootders, creatures which 
were almost all black on one side and all white on the other side and which had faces on both sides of 
their heads, heads that could be detached and thrown at their enemies. Id. at 235–38. After escaping the 
soup kettle, the group walked until they reached the edge of the deadly desert that encircled the Land of 
Oz, where they contacted Johnny Dooit who built them a sand boat that allowed them to cross the desert 
into Oz. Id. 
45 Id. at 242–43. 
46 Id. at 244. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 246–50. 
49 Id. at 242–52. 
50 Id. at 251. 
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in any other part of the world any one of them would have been 
worth a fortune to its owner. The sidewalks were superb marble 
slabs polished as smooth as glass, and the curbs . . . were also set 
thick with clustered emeralds. There were many people on these 
walks . . . all dressed in handsome garments of silk or satin or 




The shaggy man begins to learn, in pieces, that in Oz the people work 
only half of the time and play the other half. They work to build and to 
farm and to supply all of their needs.52 But they do not use money. As the 
Tin Man explains, Oz has ―no rich, and no poor; for what one wishes the 
others all try to give him, in order to make him happy, and no one in all Oz 
cares to have more than he can use.‖53 He also notes that the idea of money 
in Oz is a ―queer‖ idea because ―[i]f we used money to buy things with, 
instead of love and kindness and the desire to please one another, then we 
should be no better than the rest of the world.‖54 
When finally the shaggy man and the others reach the palace in 
Emerald City, the capital of Oz, and the servant Jellia Jamb welcomes them 
into this wondrous place, "the [s]haggy [m]an hesitat[es].‖55 Dorothy sees 
this. She ―had never known him to be ashamed of his shaggy looks before, 
but now that he was surrounded by so much magnificence and splendor the 
shaggy man felt sadly out of place.‖56 Dorothy assures him he is welcome 
and he then dusts off his shaggy shoes and enters the grand hall of the 
palace.57 After entering, Baum elegantly explains the shaggy man‘s 
reaction: 
[T]he shaggy man stood in the great hall, his shaggy hat in his 
hands, wondering what would become of him. He had never been a 
guest in a fine palace before; perhaps he had never been a guest 
anywhere. In the big cold, outside world people did not invite 
shaggy men to their homes, and this shaggy man of ours had slept 
more in haylofts and stables than in comfortable rooms. When the 
others left the great hall . . . he expected to be ordered out, [instead 
a splendidly dressed servant] bowed before him as respectfully as 
if he had been a prince [and offered to show him to his room].
58
 
. . . . 
 
[Upon arriving to his room the shaggy man] gazed upon all [the] 
luxury with silent amazement. Then he decided, being wise in his 
way, to take advantage of his good fortune. He removed his shaggy 
boots and his shaggy clothing, and bathed in the pool with rare 
enjoyment. After he had dried himself . . . [he] took fresh linen 
                                                          
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 246. 
54 Id. 
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from the drawers and put it on, finding that everything fitted him 
exactly. He examined the contents of the closets and selected an 
elegant suit of clothing. Strangely enough, everything about it was 
shaggy, although so new and beautiful, and he sighed with 
contentment to realize that he could now be finely dressed and still 
be the shaggy man. His coat was of rose-colored velvet, trimmed 
with shags and bobtails, with buttons of blood-red rubies and 
golden shags around the edges. His vest was a shaggy satin of a 
delicate cream color, and his knee breeches of rose velvet trimmed 
like the coat. Shaggy creamy stockings of silk, and shaggy slippers 
of rose leather with ruby buckles, completed his costume, and 
when he was thus attired the shaggy man looked at himself in a 
long mirror with great admiration.
59
 
So is the shaggy man‘s welcome. When Dorothy sees him ―all clad in 
shaggy new raiment,‖ she is very pleased.60 When Dorothy finally 
introduces him to Princess Ozma, the Princess too is pleased ―because she 
had meant the shaggy man to remain shaggy when she provided his new 
clothes for him.‖61 
Dorothy introduces the shaggy man as the one who owns the Love 
Magnet. Princess Ozma then asks the shaggy man from where he got the 
magnet and the shaggy man tells her a story quite different from the one he 
had told Dorothy. The shaggy man had stolen the magnet!
62
 When Princess 
Ozma asks him why, he explains he stole it because: 
[N]o one loved me, or cared for me . . . and I wanted to be loved a 
great deal. It was owned by a girl in Butterfield who was loved too 
much, so that the young men quarreled over her, which made her 
unhappy. After I had stolen the Magnet from her, only one young 




When asked whether he was sorry for stealing the magnet, he replies, ―No, 
your Highness; I‘m glad . . . for it has pleased me to be loved and if 
Dorothy had not cared for me I could not have accompanied her to this 
beautiful Land of Oz, or met its kind-hearted Ruler. Now that I‘m here, I 
hope to remain . . . .‖64 
Princess Ozma explains that in Oz, people ―were loved for themselves 
alone, and for their kindness to one another, and for their good deeds.‖65 
They both then agree to place the magnet over the gate at the entrance of 
the Emerald City.  
Afterwards, there are magnificent celebrations for Princess Ozma‘s 
birthday, in which everybody participates. When the celebrations are 
finished, and almost all of the guests, including Button-Bright and 
                                                          
59 Id. at 253 (emphasis added). 
60 Id. at 254. 
61 Id. at 254. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 254–55. 
64 Id. at 255. 
65 Id. 
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Polychrome have returned home, Princess Ozma ―decide[s] to allow 
[Shaggy man] to live in Oz for a time, at least. If he prove[s] honest and 
true she promise[s] to let him live there always, and the shaggy man [is] 
anxious to earn this reward.‖66  
It seems he is well on his way to earning this reward when he advises 
Princess Ozma that ―self-preservation [is] the first law of nature.‖67 
Nonetheless, the Shaggy man decides to remain by her side, along with 
others, when she refuses to fight to save her kingdom and herself from 
imminent attack and destruction.68 
III. THE SHAGGY MAN‘S WELCOME: RECOGNIZING 
DIFFERENCE 
. . . and he sighed with contentment to realize that he could now be 
finely dressed and still be the shaggy man. 
– L. Frank Baum, The Road to Oz69  
 
Justice O‘Connor suggested that twenty-five years from the day 
Grutter v. Bollinger was decided, racial difference should no longer be 
recognized. In Oz, however, the shaggy man gets to be fully himself. And 
to be fully himself, his full self must be recognized. And it is recognized, so 
much so, that when the shaggy man reaches his room, he is welcomed with 
clothes that fit not only his body, his physical self, but which also reflect 
and reinforce who he is, who he has become, and who he chooses to be. 
That is, the clothes demonstrate a society that recognizes, embraces, and 
facilitates his way of being and his style, both culturally and spiritually, 
even if they appear different from the rest of society. The shaggy man sighs 
―with contentment to realize he could now be finely dressed and still be the 
shaggy man.‖70 
The shaggy man‘s shagginess could be seen as a racial identity.71 That 
is, the shaggy man‘s shagginess says something about how the shaggy man 
looks.72 But like all socially constructed racial identities, his shagginess 
                                                          
66 Id. at 264. 
67 L. FRANK BAUM, THE EMERALD CITY OF OZ (1912), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BOOK OF OZ: 15-
IN-1 OMNIBUS 265, 329 (2007). 
68 Id. 
69 BAUM, supra note 2, at 253. 
70 Id. 
71 Racial identities are complex social constructs that inform and structure multiple dimensions of 
existence and experience through reference to how people look. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD 
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d. ed. 1994). 
People then must themselves structure and carve out their identities, decide who they are or who they 
want to be in reaction to these ascribed traits, and in the process create together with others complex 
social and cultural ways of surviving and living. See Athena D. Mutua, Theorizing Progressive Black 
Masculinities, in Progressive Masculinities, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES 3, 14 (Athena 
Mutua ed., 2006) (suggesting that masculine identities similarly are both internalized and enacted as 
well as constructed and chosen by individuals). 
72 Although his shaggy feature does not appear to be connected to a group, which is fundamental to 
racial identity. See, Rolanda L. Johnson, Racial Identity from an African American Perspective, J. 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY (Fall 2002), available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0MJU/is_3_9/ai_94639401/ (noting that ―racial identity is 
defined as the degree to which a person feels connected to or shares commonalities with an ethnic-racial 
group). 
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also says something about how he exists in the world and the way that 
existence, both culturally and spiritually, is shaped and informed not only 
by who he is and chooses to be, but also by how he is seen and treated in 
the world.73 For instance, the shaggy man is a wanderer. He explains, ―I‘ve 
been a rover all my life, and although Princess Ozma has given me a suite 
of beautiful rooms in her palace I still get the wandering fever once in a 
while and start out to roam the country over.‖74 While it is not clear 
whether the shaggy man is shaggy because he was a wanderer and 
potentially poor75 or whether he was a wanderer because he is shaggy, it is 
clear that he values his identity as a shaggy man.76 
The shaggy man‘s identity would not be appreciated in the United 
States where his looks and ways of being would render him uncared for and 
unlovable.77 Baum explains, ―in the big cold, outside world people did not 
invite shaggy men to their homes, and this shaggy man of ours had slept 
more in hay-lofts and stables than in comfortable rooms.‖78 In addition, the 
shaggy man had to steal the Love Magnet in order to be provided love and 
care. This is because the shaggy man was not perceived and appreciated as 
unique, but rather perceived as different from an established norm, a norm 
that rendered him different and unlovable, while rendering others detested. 
Nor were the shaggy man‘s looks valued in Dunkiton—which is outside of 
Oz—where to be fully appreciated he was made to look like a donkey. 
This is in contrast to his experience in Oz. He is appreciated in Oz 
because in Oz, people care about sentient beings of all sorts. The shaggy 
man‘s aspects of personhood, like his shaggy wandering spirit, were first 
recognized, then embraced and facilitated.
 The shaggy man‘s welcome and 
acceptance suggests that Justice O‘Connor has misdiagnosed the problem 
of racism on two fronts. First, the problem is not one of recognition as she 
suggests, but is one of lack of appreciation and oppression. Her error is 
made more dangerous because Justice O‘Connor ignores white normativity 
and domination, which defines difference and structures oppression, 
reinforcing them both. Second, she has misunderstood the complexity of 
racial identity. The history and continuing predominance of white 
normatively and domination in part give rise and passion to the diversity 
discourse, but they also ground Justice O‘Connor‘s perspective and various 
missteps. 
                                                          
73 In fact all identities are in some ways shaped this way. See Mutua, supra note 71, at 13–15. 
74 L. FRANK BAUM, THE PATCHWORK GIRL OF OZ (1913), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BOOK OF OZ: 15-
IN-1 OMNIBUS 339, 365 (2007). 
75 This is simply one interpretation of who the shaggy man might be. See supra  note 19 (understanding 
the shaggy man as a tramp as opposed to a hobo or hum).  
76 BAUM, supra note 2, at 253 (describing shaggy man sighing when he realizes he can still be shaggy). 
These are not the only parts of Shaggy man‘s identity.  
77 It is not clear that the shaggy man originates or lives in Kansas as Dorothy does. For example, not 
only does the shaggy man ask Dorothy for directions but he also explains that he is ―a stranger in these 
parts.‖ Id. at 216. While this could simply mean that he is from another part of Kansas, the reader never 
really learns exactly where in the United States he was born or lives. In fact it is not clear that the 
shaggy man lives in any particular place.  
78 Id. at 253. 
226 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 20:215 
 
A. DIVERSITY: OUT OF HISTORICAL OPPRESSION 
Here on the first day that matters, dominance was achieved, 
probably by force. By the second day, division along the same lines 
had to be relatively firmly in place. On the third day, if not sooner, 
differences were demarcated, together with social systems to 
exaggerate them in perception and in fact, because the 
systematically differential delivery of benefits and deprivations 
required making no mistake about who was who. 
– Catherine MacKinnon, On Difference and Dominance79 
 
Justice O‘Connor located the problem of racial oppression with the 
recognition of race. But diversity, at least racial diversity, requires the 
recognition of race and racial difference. This is a conundrum. But the 
concept of diversity can only be understood against the historical 
background of white domination and oppression of non-whites. The 
conundrum is created in part by the continuing practice of that domination 
as well as Justice O‘Connor‘s and other‘s misdiagnosis of the problem as a 
problem of recognition of race. 
The United States was and is not so different from Oz. One could argue 
that human and group differences and uniqueness have always existed. 
Historically, the Native American populations were quite diverse, speaking 
a host of different languages and living in a plethora of different ways. 
With the arrival of various groups from around the world, the number of 
these differences increased. But the differences between the United States 
and Oz is not that the United States was inhabited by a host of different 
peoples, each noting and recognizing each others‘ uniqueness, but rather 
that these peoples came to be dominated by one group, in law and in 
practice, Europeans, who demarcated Native Americans, among others, as 
different and inferior to themselves.
80
 Europeans established a hierarchy for 
the purpose of extracting from others and monopolizing for themselves, the 
resources of the country and later the world.81 
According to Jared Diamond, the rise of Europe approximately 500 
years ago marked a change in the status of a people who for most of their 
history remained the intellectual and economic backwater of Asia.82 They 
struck out into the world as a seafaring people with a combination of steel, 
guns, and germs,83 which allowed them not only to explore and trade with 
other peoples of the world, but also to conquer, subdue, and exploit other 
                                                          
79 CATHARINE MACKINNON, On Difference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), 
reprinted in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 241, 247 (Leslie Bender & Daan 
Braveman eds., 1995). 
80 See generally RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 
(1993). 
81 Bush, like others, argues that white supremacy is a global order. See RODERICK D. BUSH, THE END OF 
WHITE WORLD SUPREMACY: BLACK INTERNATIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE COLOR LINE 7–8 
(2009). 
82 JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 409-10 (1997). See 
also CHARLES MILLS, RACIAL CONTRACT 33 (1999) (making a similar point).  
83 DIAMOND supra note 82 at 354-75 (comparing the landscapes and historical endowments of Eurasia 
and America from which Europeans and Native Americans originate). 
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people. And they did so with genocidal expertise while claiming the 
knowledge and resources of these peoples as their own.84 
In the Americas, the Europeans nearly wiped out the Amerindian 
population85 and seized, built on, and exploited their land with the labor and 
expertise of enslaved Africans, among others, all while claiming the 
blessings of a Christian God and purporting to share those blessings.86 In 
short order, they claimed themselves as white and superior to all others, 
demarcating the presumed differences between themselves and the colored 
others, as well as the differences among the others and all the while 
assigning themselves their most virtuous and valued traits.87 As virtuous 
free men, Europeans became the top of the hierarchy and designated the 
enslaved Africans, as depraved and on the bottom of the hierarchy. The 
other colored groups fell in-between.88 Domination, however, is never 
absolute and the colored groups resisted white oppression even as they 
continued to adopt and intertwine white cultural practices with their own 
and to develop alternative cultural practices and understandings, even of 
imposed religions.89 They thereby created new cultures and ways of being. 
                                                          
84 See Charles Miller, White Supremacy as Sociopolitical System: A Philosophical Perspective, in 
WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM 35, 45 (Ashley W. Doane & Eduardo Bonilla-
Silva eds., 2003) (discussing cultural appropriation of others‘ knowledge without acknowledging its 
origins, a feature of white supremacy). This history, one summarized in this Article with the author‘s 
own emphasis, is currently being repeatedly retold. See, e.g., JOE FEAGIN, THE WHITE RACIAL FRAME: 
CENTURIES OF RACIAL FRAMING AND COUNTER-FRAMING (2010) (telling the story for the purposes of 
explaining the creation and development of the frame); David Roediger, HOW RACE SURVIVED U.S. 
HISTORY: FROM SETTLEMENT AND SLAVERY TO THE OBAMA PHENOMENON (2008). 
85 See DAVID STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD, at X (1992) 
(arguing that "[t]he destruction of the Indians of the Americas was, far and away, the most massive act 
of genocide in the history of the world," with almost 100 million Amerindians killed in what he calls the 
American Holocaust). But see Guenter Lewy, Were American Indians the Victims of Genocide?, HIST. 
NEWS NETWORK (Nov. 22, 2004), http://hnn.us/articles/7302.html (suggesting that most of the 
American Indians died from disease). 
86 See, e.g., FEAGIN, supra note 84, at 25 (discussing the meaning of ―Manifest Destiny‖). 
87 Id. at 11, 56 (noting that ―whites have long viewed themselves as . . . good-looking physically, 
intelligent, and culturally and morally superior, as the virtuous Americans‖). 
88 I have argued that one of the meanings of the black/white paradigm is that it places other minorities, 
such as Latinos, Latinas and Asian Americans, in between blacks and whites. The paradigm has been 
under serious attack for a number of years because it appears to ignore these and other minorities. See 
Athena D. Mutua, Shifting Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the 
Black/White Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177 (1999). See also, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Current 
Landscape of Race: Old Targets, New Opportunities,104 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1272 (2006); Rachel F. 
Moran, Neither Black Nor White, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 61, 81–82 (1997); Juan R. Perea, The 
Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The ―Normal Science‖ of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1213, 1220, 1254 (1997) (arguing that the black/white paradigm promotes the invisibility and 
marginalized Latina/o experiences). Devon W. Carbado has surveyed and examined a variety of these 
critiques. See Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1305–12 (2002). 
89 See OMI & WINANT, supra note 71, at 79–80 (citing EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: 
THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1976) (1972)) (noting ―Even at its most oppressive, the racial order 
was unable to arrogate to itself the entire capacity for the production of racial meaning, of racial 
subjects. Racial minorities were always able to counter pose their own culture traditions, their own 
forms of organization and identity . . . [a]s the voluminous literature on black culture under slavery 
shows, black slaves developed cultures of resistance based on music, religion, African traditions and 
family ties . . . .‖); JULIUS LESTER, TO BE A SLAVE (7th prtg. 1980); Vincent Harding, Religion and 
Resistance Among Antebellum Negroes, 1800–1860, in 1 THE MAKING OF BLACK AMERICA, THE 
ORIGINS OF BLACK AMERICANS 179 (August Meier & Elliott Rudwick eds., 1969); GEORGE P. RAWICK, 
1 FROM SUNDOWN TO SUNUP: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY (1972); HERBERT GUTMAN, 
THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM (1976)). See also JAMES H. CONE, A BLACK THEOLOGY 
OF LIBERATION (1986) (originally published in 1970 and understanding the Bible and Christianity 
through the interpretative lens of the African American experience). 
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But Europeans in America and abroad, having enhanced their wealth 
and power with the previous extractive and oppressive systems, created 
new systems out of the ashes of the old to maintain their dominance.91 They 
also more clearly articulated, enshrined in culture and in law, and 
institutionalized the ideology of white supremacy. This period, called the 
Jim Crow period, was, from a black perspective, the second phase of the 
racial order that the white elite imposed.
92
 Here, the white elite clearly 
recognized race and recognized difference, but they did so for the 
continuing purpose of privileging some at the expense of others.  
Nevertheless, people of color developed social movements of 
resistance and change, drawing on their cultural and historical practices, as 
well as on stories that whites tell about their commitment to freedom, 
liberty, fairness, and democracy—secondary social stories that belie the 
reality of racial, gendered, and ethnic hierarchies and philosophies.93 
Together with other changes in the world,94 these social movements, by the 
mid-twentieth century, began to transform in many ways the status quo of 
blatant racial oppression and usher in the third and current period of the 
white dominated racial order.  
It is in the current period that the rhetoric of diversity has arisen. 
Whites, in reaction to the social movements of the different colored groups 
and to the changes in the world, move to demonstrate their commitment to 
values of freedom, democracy, and fairness: ideas they claim to have long-
practiced, but which are belied by reality.95 Consequently, they are forced to 
better incorporate the peoples of color into the polity. They are also forced 
to eliminate the notions and practices of white superiority in law. They 
initiate affirmative action policies, which promote the token appearance of 
                                                          
90 U.S. CONST. amend XIII (abolishing slavery in the United States in 1865 and prohibiting its existence 
except as punishment for a crime). 
91 See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME (2008) (discussing sharecropping 
and the other mechanisms used to re-enslave black people after the civil war). 
92 The period of official legal racial segregation in the United States is commonly referred to as the Jim 
Crow system. Although segregation laws appear on the books of many states before 1877, Woodard 
dates the period beginning in 1877 with the compromise between Republicans and Southern Democrats 
that made Rutherford B. Hayes president. It ended in 1965 after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, PUB. L. NO. 88-352, 78 STAT. 241 and the National Voting Rights Act of 1965 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–
1973aa-6 (2010). C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 52–53, 192–94 
(Commemorative ed. 2001). 
93 FEAGIN, supra note 84, at 18–19, 155–58 (explaining that in addition to the white racial frame there is 
a ―white-crafted liberty and justice frame that is mostly rhetorical for most white Americans although 
over time a very small minority of whites has taken it seriously; for example white abolitionists during 
slavery or the miniscule numbers of whites who participated in the civil rights movement.‖). See also 
MILLS, supra note 82 (suggesting, as a philosophical matter that the social contract including notions of 
fairness and justice implemented in American society was limited to whites and that the real social 
contract as between whites and non-whites is that of a racial hierarchy, the racial order in which 
injustice, inequity, and white domination, exploitation, and genocide against nonwhites are the 
foundational principles).  
94 See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002) (discussing the changes in the world that affect United States domestic 
policy and arguing in part that the Brown decision came about because of its value to whites in sending 
a signal to the world about American democracy).  
95 DUDZIAK, supra note 94, at 116–18, 250–51 (discussing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954)). 
2010] Valuing Difference, Exercising Care in Oz 229 
 
peoples of color in American institutions. But they do not destroy the 
bureaucratic, institutional, or even the silent but ideological practices of 
white supremacy that maintain their domination. For instance, they rename 
white cultural practices, domination, and privileges merit, forcing others to 
abandon their cultural practices of life and resistance in order to merit 
inclusion.96 In other words, they force assimilation to the norms they dictate 
by their domination as the price of token inclusion and thereby continue to 
assign to themselves the lion‘s share of the country‘s wealth.97  
In the process, whites, like Justice O‘Connor, assigned the blame of the 
historical racial oppression and the maldistribution of resources along racial 
lines to the historic recognition of difference as opposed to the historic, 
continuing, structural, and ideological practice of white domination and 
oppression. Difference surely existed before white domination and 
oppression, but it was the assignment of difference with the maldistribution 
of goods along racial lines, after the achievement and at the behest of white 
domination, that structured the problem of white racial privilege through 
the oppression and disadvantage of colored people. 
                                                          
96 See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 
1449, 1475–94 (discussing the formulation of merit standards and the historical development of the 
LSAT, a development meant to exclude Eastern and Southern Europeans from the practice of law); John 
Hayakawa Torok, LatCrit VII: Coalitional Theory and Praxis: Social Justice Movements and LatCrit 
Community: Progressive Pedagogy: Challenging Master Narratives with Racial and Ethnic Curricular 
and Faculty Diversity: The Story of "Towards Asian American Jurisprudence" and Its Implications for 
Latinas/os in American Law Schools, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 271 (2002) (discussing ―meritocratic 
fundamentalism‖ which suggests that grades and tests measure merit and citing Duncan Kennedy, A 
Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, DUKE L. J. 705, 707–12, 719–21 
(1990) (addressing colorblind meritocratic fundamentalism and destabilizing attitudes about merit and 
race)). For a discussion of cultural bias, racially-biased validating practices, and institutional racism in 
standardized testing, see William C. Kidder, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Recent 
Developments in Litigation, Admissions, and Diversity Research, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 173 (2001); Jay 
Rosner, Disparate Outcomes By Design: University Admissions Tests, 112 LA RAZA L.J. 377, 379, 383–
84 (2001); David M. White, The Requirement of Race-Conscious Evaluation of LSAT Scores for 
Equitable Law School Admissions, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 399 (2001). See also Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, 
The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 957 (1996) 
(criticizing reliance on standardized tests).  
The debate over multiculturalism is in part a debate about the Eurocentrism (and patriarchy) of the 
standard curriculum and also is a critique of what constitutes merit. See, e.g., Peggy McIntosh, White 
Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in 
Women’s Studies (Wellesley C. Center Res. on Women, Working Paper No.189, 1988) (discussing the 
maleness of the curriculum as a starting point for analyzing racial privilege); CHRISTINE E. SLEETER, 
UN-STANDARDIZING CURRICULUM: MULTICULTURAL TEACHING IN THE STANDARDS-BASED 
CLASSROOM 150–52, 167–82 (2005); William C. Welburn, Multicultural Curriculum in Higher 
Education, 27: 1 J. OF LIBR. ADMIN. 157 (1999).  
Work being done on the issue of whether meritocracy is a myth shows that wealth is the 
determining factor of performance on tests. See, e.g., Ross Douthat, Does Meritocracy Work?, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Nov. 2005), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/does-
meritocracy-work/4305/; Interview by Rebecca Parish with Lani Guinier, in DOLLARS AND SENSE, 
Jan./Feb. 2006, available at http://www.nathanielturner.com/meritocracymyth.htm. Though Peter 
Schmidt‘s book is primarily concerned with class, it is a discussion of class that is really a discussion 
about race—white racial privilege. That is, it is primarily concerned about poor and middleclass whites 
and written for their benefit. It sees white elites simply using race and affirmative action to protect 
elite‘s advantages. See PETER SCHMIDT, COLOR AND MONEY: HOW RICH WHITE KIDS ARE WINNING 
THE WAR OVER COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (2007). See also STEPHEN J. MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. 
MILLER JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2d. ed. 2009) (arguing in 
part that the notion of meritocracy is an ideology meant to mask but perpetuate inequality).  
97 See supra note 96. See also McIntosh, supra note 96; SLEETER, supra note 96; Wellborn, supra note 
96 (discussing multicultural education). 
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B. NON-RECOGNITION OF RACE AND WHITE NORMATIVITY IN 
GRUTTER 
In the Grutter v. Bollinger opinion, Justice O‘Connor recognized that 
race still matters.98 She explains that ―[j]ust as growing up in a particular 
region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an 
individual‘s views, so too is one‘s own, unique experience of being a racial 
minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still 
matters.‖99 But Justice O‘Connor‘s explanation, and indeed her opinion, 
reveal at least two different understandings of race. One understanding is 
that in creating diversity, racial minority identity may represent or be a 
proxy for different cultural practices, ideas, and viewpoints,100 even though 
minority individuals may not always or even consistently express some 
characteristic minority view or partake in some characteristic practice.101 
On the other hand, Justice O‘Connor finds the fact that race still matters 
unfortunate. Here, she understands race simply as a reflection of unequal 
power and historic inequality. Ultimately, this latter view triumphs in her 
opinion and her hope is that in the future all people will be treated equally, 
without regard to their racial identity.
102
 But, Why do people‘s racial 
identities need to be disregarded in order for them to be treated equally? 
Why should diversity, racial diversity in particular, matter now and not in 
the future? Finally, Why should diversity occur in the absence of the 
recognition of race in the future when Justice O‘Connor‘s reasoning, and 
the equal protection case law that followed Grutter,
103
 does nothing to 
change the underlying structures and practices that result in the lack of 
diversity now and in the first place? 
Justice O‘Connor‘s perspective, a perspective of non-recognition, of 
blindness, could be interpreted as a well-meaning attempt to rectify and 
correct the racial hierarchy created by whites. But this attempt, and the 
hungering for colorblindness, nevertheless, reflect a white power 
perspective104 in which the power of those who dominate can and do 
remain invisible as a race and invisible as a privileged race even to 
themselves. One consequence of this invisible power is that they 
understand and see themselves as ―the generic, the universal, [and] the 
generalizable‖;105 they see themselves as the norm. They believe that their 
                                                          
98 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–29, 333 (2003). 
99 Id. at 333. 
100 Id. at 330–31 (discussing value of diversity in a global marketplace).  
101 Id. at 333. 
102 See generally id. 
103 See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 565, 565–567 (2008) 
(discussing the Supreme Court case Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)). 
104 See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, ―Was Blind, but Now I See‖: White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 970–73 (1993). 
105 Michael Kimmel, Toward a Pedagogy of the Oppressor, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK 
MASCULINITIES, supra note 71, at 63. Kimmel explains the politics of invisibility and notes: 
―Invisibility is a privilege in a double sense—hiding the power relations that are kept in place by 
the very dynamics of invisibility, and in the sense of privilege as luxury. It is a luxury that only 
white people have in our society not to think about race every minute of their lives.‖ Id. at 65. 
Kimmel gives another example of how dominance and invisibility works:  
You have probably noticed that there is one big difference between e-mail addresses in the 
United States and e-mail addresses of people in other countries: Their addresses have country 
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way of ―not admitting to seeing race‖ is the correct solution to the problem 
of racial oppression. That is, this perspective informs their views on how 
the issue of racial oppression and inequality should be handled. However, 
the imposition of this view, whether well-intentioned or not, remains an 
imposition, a prerogative of power. But it has other benefits as well. 
The beauty of labeling the problem of oppression as one of racial 
recognition is that whites have been able to remove the stain of the term 
white supremacy while maintaining the institutions and habits that structure 
white dominance and hinder diversity. It maintains the institutions and 
habits of racial oppression by eliminating a crucial way of recognizing it 
(that is, through race consciousness) and makes it appear as if the non-
recognition of race solves the problem of racial oppression, thereby 
justifying the preclusion of more radical measures to intervene and change 
these structures and habits. As a consequence, the institutions and habits of 
white dominance and privilege are left in place undetected so that they 
operate as a hidden norm against which others are measured. 
The hidden normativity of whiteness becomes evident in Justice 
O‘Connor‘s decision. She advocates for diversity, but the diversity sought 
as she encourages the admission of minority students appears to be for the 
benefit of white students.106 Justice O‘Connor suggests that admitting 
minorities into a school contributes to a diverse educational environment. 
Presumably, this new educational environment is for whites.107 
Furthermore, she argues that minorities‘ presence in the classroom 
―augment[s] a robust exchange of ideas demonstrating that there is no 
minority viewpoint,‖108 again, presumably for the benefit of white students. 
She also believes it is important to have minorities in the legal profession, 
not so that they might help structure better laws or that they might meet the 
legal needs of their communities,109 but so that they might ―visibly lend 
legitimacy to the system by signifying that the path to leadership is open to 
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity,‖110 even if the 
system is neither open nor legitimate. Behind each of her rationales stands 
the concern for white people and the normativity of whiteness. Her 
rationales reinforce this norm, while her goal of non-recognition of race in 
the future imposes a white perspective that furthers this norm. 
The non-recognition of race also allows whites to equate and to smear 
the practices of colored people‘s cultural expression and resistance with the 
same brush rightly used to smear the practices of white violence and 
                                                                                                                                      
codes at the end of the address. So, for example, if you are writing to someone in South Africa, 
you put ―za‖ at the end, or ―jp‖ for Japan . . . . [This] is because when you are the dominant 
power in the world, everyone else needs to be named. When you are in power, you need not 
draw attention to yourself . . . . 
Id. at 65–66.  
106 Sheldon Zedeck et al., Who Gets In? The Quest for Diversity After Grutter, Panel, in 52 BUFF. L. 
REV. 531, 590–94 (2004) (moderated by Athena D. Mutua); Daria Roithmayr, Tacking Left: A Radical 
Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 207 (2004). 
107 Zedeck, supra note 106, at 592 (moderator Athena Mutua making this same argument). 
108 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003). 
109 See generally id. O‘Connor relies on University of California v. Bakke in noting that although the 
goal of having minorities meet the underserved needs of their communities might be important, it is not 
enough to justify the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions; it is not legal. 
110 Id. at 332. 
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domination by stigmatizing racial consciousness itself, and thereby 
stigmatizing and perhaps hindering colored people‘s resistance.111 The 
result is that the non-recognition of race allows whites to ignore their 
continuing domination and privilege. At the same time, whites can demean 
the race-consciousness and solidarity of other groups, which hinders their 
ability to dismantle the apparatus of white supremacy. The non-recognition 
of race, combined with the continuation of white domination and 
normativity, leaves white power intact and unchallenged to reign for 
another day.112 
Recognizing racial difference, on the other hand, allows the society to 
see the continuing forced assimilation to and operation of white control, as 
well as the resistance to it. It also potentially allows the elevation and 
equality of alternative insights and cultural expressions. In short it may 
allow people of color to be themselves, or what they choose to be outside 
of white dictates. 
C. RECOGNIZING COMPLEXITY: FREE TO BE ME 
While Justice O‘Connor recognizes that racial identity and the racial 
formation process may be more than simply a reflection of unequal power, 
                                                          
111 See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT 
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 127 (Kimberleé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). A host of scholars have analyzed 
and commented on the ridiculousness of the claim that black resistance is the same as white oppression. 
See, e.g., Ian Haney López, A Nation of Minorities: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 987 (2007) (citing J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 
(1997); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1003 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); 
William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999); Reva Siegel, Why 
Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 1111 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994)) (noting 
that the equation of efforts to advance equality with efforts to subjugate would ―merit[] . . . derision‖ 
except that ―the Supreme Court . . . has moved ever closer to a full embrace‖ of it as a basis for 
―contemporary constitutional antidiscrimination law;‖ and noting that most prominent scholars reject 
this anti-classification approach in favor of a anti-subordination approach to antidiscrimination law). 
Justice Stevens also commented on this equivalency in his dissent in Adarand Constructors by stating: 
The Court's concept of ―consistency‖ assumes that there is no significant difference between 
a decision by the majority to impose a special burden on the members of a minority race and 
a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to certain members of that minority 
notwithstanding its incidental burden on some members of the majority. In my opinion that 
assumption is untenable. There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy 
that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial 
subordination. . . . The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the difference 
between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat.  
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
112 There has been an ongoing debate not just between whites and people of color but also among 
scholars of color as to whether race consciousness and thus racial identities should be retained. See 
PAUL GILROY, AGAINST RACE: IMAGINING POLITICAL CULTURE BEYOND THE COLOR LINE 29 (2000); 
K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMAN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 32 
(1996) ("If we are to move beyond racism we shall have, in the end, to move beyond current racial 
identities."). Cf. Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Shifting Race-Consciousness Matrix and the 
Multiracial Category Movement: A Critical Reply to Professor Hernandez, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
231, 232–33 (2000) (arguing that race does not exist beyond its historical and social contexts); Sharon 
Hoffman, Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1093 (2004) (suggesting 
that we begin to use more specific terms such as color, national origin, etc instead of racial categories). 
But cf. Darren Lenoard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, 
and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1458 (2002) (demonstrating the pitfalls of non-recognition of 
race); Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race Consciousness and 
Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483, 490 (2003) (seeking a compromise in the 
short term but ultimately seeking the elimination of race consciousness).  
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she ultimately imposes a worldview that speaks only to this aspect of the 
racial order. That is, she does not appreciate the complexity of racial 
identity, and may not even understand the complexity of her own identity. 
Said differently, she may not see that her perspective, in all too many ways, 
reflects her privileged white racial identity and its basis in the prerogatives 
of power.113 But many scholars have analyzed the multitude of meanings 
that the term race conveys, even in court cases.114 Others have discussed the 
complexity and multidimensionality of racial identity.115 To the extent that 
Justice O‘Connor ignores this complexity, she crafts at best a superficial 
solution to the problem of racial oppression and diversity. 
Her perspective, while potentially acknowledging the fact that whites 
created a racial order for their own aggrandizement, fails to capture the 
reality that history did not stop at the point when the racial order was 
formed. Nor does it capture the fact that people of color continue to live 
and create philosophical traditions, alternative understandings of the world, 
and human relations and culture after the imposition of that order—both in 
response to it and despite it. Further, Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion does not 
appear to contemplate the fact that people of color through their own lives 
and circumstances might have imbued racial identity with meanings, 
including cultural meanings, other than those of oppression and 
exploitation and might, therefore, find something of real value in those 
meanings. In fact, they have. Neil Gotanda notes in reference to African 
Americans: 
[A] substantial literature has developed that recognizes the 
existence of a distinctly Black culture and its contributions to 
American life. While the emergence of Black literary criticism has 
been perhaps the most dramatic example, there has been a 
corresponding recognition of "minority" critiques in many areas, 
                                                          
113 Justice O‘Connor may have been operating from a white racial frame. Feagin argues that a ―white 
racial frame has become part of most whites‘ character structure, a character structure habitually 
operated out of, with individual variations, in everyday life.‖ FEAGIN, supra note 84, at 15. That is, a 
white racial frame is part of whites‘ racial identity. This frame combines ―(1.) racial stereotypes (a 
beliefs aspect); (2.) racial narratives and interpretations (integrating cognitive aspects); (3.) racial 
images (a visual aspect) and language accents(an auditory aspect); (4.) racialized emotions (a ‗feelings 
aspect‘); and (5.) inclinations to discriminatory action.‖ Id. at 10–11. It also encompasses a positive 
orientation toward whites and whiteness and a negative one toward people of color. Id. at 13–18. It 
operates at both an emotional and cognitive level in ways that denigrate people of color and their 
cultures and dehumanize institutions. 
114 Gotanda, supra note 13. 
115 See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1467–72 (discussing the relationship between racial identity 
and resistance and the multidimensionality of racial identity and subordination); Johnson, supra note 72 
(noting that ―contrary to previous thought, racial identity is a multidimensional construct‖); Rav 
Ravinder Barn, Care Leavers and Social Capital: Understanding and Negotiating Racial and Ethnic 
Identity, 33 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 5, 2010 at 832, 832–50 (May, 2010) (explaining: ―Racial and 
ethnic identity have also been defined in specific ways. Racial identity has been defined as ‗a sense of 
group or collective identity based on one‘s perception that he or she shares a common racial heritage 
with a particular racial group . . . .‘ Ethnic identity refers to ‗one‘s sense of belonging to an ethnic group 
and the part of one‘s thinking, perception, feelings, and behaviour that is due to ethnic group 
membership . . . .‘ Thus, aspects such as a shared history, common values and beliefs, and customs are 
important in ethnic group membership, and a sense of belonging to a racial group predominates in racial 
group identification. Thus, a person may define their racial identity as Asian, but may choose to define 
their ethnic identity according to ethnicity, for example as Indian, or Punjabi. It has been argued that 
race and ethnicity are highly salient for all minority groups throughout their life span . . . ‖ (internal 
citations omitted)). It is important to recognize, however, that the complexities of racial and ethnic 
identity should not be reduced to race/colour, or cultural simplifications.  
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including legal scholarship. In popular culture as well, there has 
been a belated recognition of the importance of Black culture. . . . . 
[T]here is no consensus that a color-blind norm, the racial non-
recognition advocated for public sphere constitutional discourse, is 
the desired social norm for general application in the private 
sphere. . . . The adoption of a strong version of color-blindness and 
a refusal to permit culture-race in the public sphere implicitly 
promotes white cultural dominance.
116
 
Nevertheless, many have decried ―Black culture‖ as deficient; while 
some simply point out its faults,117 others use critiques of culture as a more 
acceptable way to continue to denigrate black people.118 Although critiques 
of Black culture have always been a part of white America‘s denigration 
and oppression of black people,119 in the past, tales of black inferiority were 
linked more directly to their bodies, or their ―race,‖ as it were. As the idea 
of race as a biological feature has been gradually discredited,120 the 
critiques in this current period of the racial order have moved steadily 
toward critiques of black and other people of color‘s culture. For instance, 
poor family structure or false consciousness about racism are often said to 
be the primary causes of black people‘s disproportionate poverty and other 
problems.121 It appears that almost anything other than four hundred years 
of oppression (which includes one hundred years of segregation, which still 
exists today in new forms) explains their situation. Denigration of black 
and other people‘s looks, however, has not disappeared entirely. Culturally 
affirming dress, hairstyles, and orientation—ways of being that inform the 
way people look—still continue to be judged as unacceptable in certain 
spaces.122 
                                                          
116 Gotanda, supra note 13, at 58–59. 
117 Consider for instance the controversy over Bill Cosby‘s comments about black culture and black 
poor people. See MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, IS BILL COSBY RIGHT?: OR HAS THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 
LOST ITS MIND? (2005). 
118 The modern denigration of black culture is situated in the critique of black families, a family 
structure that Moynihan saw as deviantly matriarchal. This deviance together with government policies, 
so the argument goes, has resulted in low marriage rates, high levels of out-of-wedlock childbirth which 
leads to poverty, lack of family values, poor educational results and lack of value for education, and 
criminality. See BUSH, supra note 81, at 136–43 (describing the reassertion of patriarchy, the Moynihan 
report, and black feminism). But the notion of black culture and people as criminals has a much longer 
history. For instance, Feagin notes that laws and constitutions in the 1600s refer to the slaves as 
―barbarous, wild and savage,‖ terms which he argues serve a double purpose: ―They not only conjure up 
notions of African Americans as uncivilized, the early cultural stereotyping, but also views [them] as 
dangerous, rebellious, and criminal, a distinctive legal and moral stereotyping relating to emotional 
white concerns of African American rebelling against enslavement, against good ‗laws and orders.‖‘ 
FEAGIN, supra note 84, at 47. He also notes that six of the ten anti-black stereotypes that whites hold are 
cultural. These include: (1) uncivilized, alien, foreign; (2) immoral, criminal, and dangerous; (3) lazy; 
(4) oversexed; (5) ungrateful and rebellious; and (6) disorganized families. Id. at 56. 
119 See FEAGIN, supra note 84, at 4; MILLS, supra note 82, at 44–45. 
120 In favor of understanding race as a social construction that might have favorable attributes as well as 
negative ones, see Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1466 (discussing the way in which scholars of color 
who advocate colorblindness essentialize race and see it as inherently negative).  
121 See generally Robinson supra note 112. See also Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and 
Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329 (2006) 
(discussing the focus on postmodern discourse and the social construction of race and discussing 
Reginald Leamon Robinson, Human Agency, Negated Subjectivity, and White Structural Oppression: 
An Analysis of Critical Race Practice/Praxis, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1365–66 (2004)). 
122 See, e.g., Michelle L. Turner, The Braided Uproar: A Defense of My Sister’s Hair and Contemporary 
Indictment of Rogers v. American Airlines, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 117 (2001). 
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In other words, cultural inferiority is the mainstay of criticism today. 
There have been, however, those who have fought for blacks and other 
minority groups.
123
 Although their words are all too often used to justify 
continued black exclusion and oppression,124 these heroes‘ entire lives have 
been a testament to a critical but deeply felt respect and love for people of 
color, even as they have assessed the problems in their communities with 
piercing insight.125 A critical reading of some of these assessments provides 
a way to critically engage those community problems without malice and 
exclusionary results.126 Every community has its problems; it would be 
miraculous if communities as despised and abused as black communities 
had no problems at all. Yet these heroes recognized that while communities 
of color have their problems, the communities themselves were not the 
problem.127 Instead, a people who have embraced a philosophy and system 
of greed, self-centeredness, and racial hierarchy, and have claimed 
themselves, like the Donkeys of Dunkiton to be the highest of all 
civilizations, might just be the problem in the world.  
Ultimately, black and other minorities‘ cultures have been shaped in 
part by oppression, and their psychologies have been shaped by the white 
population‘s aversion to the mere existence of their bodies and lives. This 
shaping also informs their racial identities. Such is the complexity of racial 
identity. Nevertheless, they have continued to live and draw on their own 
historical practices and insights, as well as more modern ideas, to produce 
great things. Said differently, their life experiences, their epistemological 
insights, and their cultural practices have created world renowned music 
and art forms, literary traditions that celebrate living despite their suffering, 
redemptive religious practices and beliefs, and insights on the partiality of 
perspective.
128
 They learned how to live fully within their culture and 
contribute to the articulation of one of the most powerful social movements 
                                                          
123 Consider such people as Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, Caeser Chavez, Delores Huerta, Fanny 
Lou Hamer, A. Randolph Phillips, Angela Davis, Barnard Rustin, Ida B. Wells, Elijah Mohammed, 
W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, and innumerable others. 
124 See Justice Thomas using Fredrick Douglass‘ words in Grutter. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
349 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
125 This includes Martin Luther King, Pauli Murray, W.E.B. Du Bois, James Baldwin, Mary Church 
Terrell, Zora Neale Hurston, Marcus Garvey, Ida B. Wells, and Fredrick Douglass, among others. 
126 See, e.g., W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (Dover Publ‘ns. 1994); ZORA NEALE 
HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD, (Perennial Library 1990). 
127 Here I am thinking of Du Bois‘s question: ―How does it feel to be a problem?‖ DU BOIS, supra note 
126, at 1. My answer is much like his, black people are not the problem. 
128 Both hip hop and Jazz have been black music art forms that are world renowned. See, e.g., NELSON 
GEORGE, HIP HOP AMERICA, at ix (2005) (commenting on how hip hop and a hip hop aesthetic has 
impacted the world); Gerald Early, Jazz and the African American Literary Tradition, NATIONAL 
HUMANITIES CENTER TEACHERSERVE, 
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/freedom/1917beyond/essays/jazz.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 
2010). For more commentary on African American literary traditions, see THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION 
TO THE AFRICAN AMERICAN SLAVE NARRATIVE (Audrey A. Fisch ed., 2007) (discussing the African 
American literary tradition); Khem Guragain, African American Literary Tradition and Toni Morrison’s 
Aesthetic Perspectives, THE AFRICAN EXECUTIVE (May 6, 2009), 
http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=4324. On redemptive religious 
practices, see Cone, supra note 89. On partial perspectives see PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK 
FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT, 234–35 
(2d. ed. 2000). 
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in the last century the world has ever seen.
129
 As Roderick Bush notes, 
these ―captive people locked in a stolen land . . . articulated an 
internationalist and egalitarian vision that . . . had its own logic,‖ was built 
on their own insights,130 and which challenged the heart of the white order. 
Because of their cultural experiences, there exist alternative ways of 
viewing the world and they may yet continue to make contributions to the 
world. 
But, it is so easy to despise a despised people. This takes no great act of 
bravery at all and too many people engage in it. Consequently, it would not 
be surprising that black people and other people of color, like the shaggy 
man, might breathe a sigh of contentment if they could live well in a 
society in which they could still be people of color,131 with all the 
philosophical, cultural, and alternative understandings that it entails.132 
Their jubilance over President Obama‘s election was likely a part of this 
wistfulness.  
                                                          
129 See Athena D. Mutua, Restoring Justice to Civil Rights Movement Activists?: New Historiography 
and the ―Long Civil Rights Era (Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-12), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133130.  
130 BUSH, supra note 81, at 91 (commenting on the class first v. race first debate and noting that it was 
not the Euro-North American workers movement but the long civil rights movement in which such a 
vision arose).  
131 See John P. McQueen & Arthur L. Whaley, Evaluating Cohort and Intervention Effects on Black 
Adolescents’ Ethnic-Racial Identity: A Cognitive-Cultural Approach, 33 EVALUATION & PROGRAM 
PLAN., no. 4, 2010 at 436, 436–45 (2010) (arguing that given their racial-ethnic identity black youth 
may do better in school if schooling is framed as a way for them to help their communities. The authors 
argue: ―In the cognitive–cultural model . . . ethnic–racial identity in Black populations is defined as 
cognitive schemata consisting of beliefs, attitudes, values and behaviors that reflect a positive 
association with people of African descent. That is, the individual's identity is composed of cognitive 
schemata representing the individual self, the cultural self, and social roles. The individual self 
embodies those personal qualities that ensure successful functioning in the mainstream of society. The 
cultural self includes knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors that ground the individual in Black culture. 
Broadly speaking, these components of the African American self-system reflect the values of 
individualism and collectivism, respectively. Social roles are activities, functions and positions that 
allow the individual of African descent to integrate the individual and cultural aspects of the self. For 
African American youth, the social role of student or scholar serves this function. Schooling or 
academic achievement is an individualistic endeavor for Black youth, as it is for those of other 
ethnic/racial groups. From the cognitive–cultural perspective, if African-descended youth are 
encouraged through ethnic–racial or Africentric socialization to link their achievement to the collective 
needs of the larger Black community, they are more likely to have a balanced identity and better 
psychosocial functioning‖ (internal cites omitted)). 
132 BUSH, supra note 81, at 129, 139 (citing Anibal Quijano, Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and 
Latin America, 1 NEPANTLA: VIEWS FROM S. 533, 533–580 (2000)) (explaining that Anibal Quijano 
suggests that the first step in depriving the ―colonialist of power is epistemological decolonization‖—to 
clear the way for new intercultural communication: ―It is the very height of irrationality for some group 
to insist that its own cosmic vision should be taken as a universal rationality. This is nothing but an 
attempt to impose a provincialism as universalism. This is an attempt to liberate intercultural relations 
from the prison of coloniality [understood relations of domination better Europeans and non-Europeans] 
as inequality decimation, exploitation and domination. South people are free ‗to choose between various 
cultural orientations, and above all the freedom to produce, criticize, change, and exchange culture and 
society. This liberation is part of the process of liberation from all power organized as inequality 
discrimination, exploitation and domination.‘‖).  
While Bush agrees with Quijano, he also agrees with Walter Mignolo, who thinks there must be 
―identity in politics‖ from which people of color can speak in order to ―de-naturalize the imperial and 
racial construction of identity in the modern world system.‖ Id. at 129 (citing Walter Mignolo, The 
Decolonial Option and the Meaning of Identity in Politics, 9:10 ANALES N. E. 43–72 (2007)). 
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IV. PROVIDING FOR DIFFERENCE: AN ETHIC OF CARE 
And when she finally introduced him to Princess Ozma, Ozma 
―nodded brightly because she had meant the shaggy man to remain 
shaggy when she provided his new clothes.‖ 
– L. Frank Baum, The Road to Oz133 
 
Virginia Held notes that if we cared about people and ―took care 
seriously, . . . [i]nstead of [being] a society dominated by conflict restrained 
by law and preoccupied with economic gain, we might have a society that 
saw as its most important task the flourishing of children and the 
development of caring relations, not only in personal contexts but among 
citizens and using governmental institutions.‖134 The ethic of care, as 
developed by feminists, long after Princess Ozma‘s fictional action, is 
grounded in the universal experience of being cared for as children and 
grows out of the observations of the relationships of care between mother 
and child.135 
The response in Oz to the shaggy man‘s difference is not born out of a 
theory of difference and diversity, but rather, out of an ethic of care.136 In 
Oz, people care about beings, particularly sentient beings; they recognize 
and respect differences in these living beings, and they accommodate and 
respond to these differences by providing for them.
137
 The key here is that 
they provide for them. They provide for the shaggy man, they facilitate his 
uniqueness, and they provide for all others.
138
 They do so, not ―regardless 
of‖ his racial, class, immigration status, or ethnic difference, but in relation 
to his different, specific needs and ways of being, whether those ways are 
biologically or culturally driven.
139
 
Some scholars have agreed with Justice O‘Connor that all 
considerations of racial difference should be eliminated from decision-
making.
140
 They argue, instead, that racial considerations should be 
replaced with considerations of class difference.
141
 They appear to sense 
                                                          
133 BAUM, supra note 2, at 254. 
134 VIRGINIA HELD, THE ETHICS OF CARE: PERSONAL, POLITICAL AND GLOBAL 18 (2006). 
135 The ethic of care revives its first impetus from the work of Carol Gilligan who suggested that while 
addressing moral problems, girls seemed to be more concerned with relationships and context rather 
than focusing on abstract rules. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
THEORY AND WOMEN‘S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Though the perceived differences between girls‘ and 
boys‘ moral reasoning was challenged, it suggested alternative approaches to moral reasoning. Id. at 27. 
136 See generally HELD, supra note 134; NEL NODDINGS, STARTING AT HOME: CARING AND SOCIAL 
POLICY (2002) [hereinafter NODDINGS, STARTING AT HOME]; NEL NODDINGS, CARING; A FEMININE 
APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1986) [hereinafter NODDINGS, CARING]; MICHAEL 
SLOTE, THE ETHICS AND CARE OF EMPATHY (2007). 
137 BAUM, supra note 2, at 253. (describing the accommodations and clothes provided for the shaggy 
man; clothes that fit both his body and his shaggy style). See also infra notes 158–169 and 
accompanying text.  
138 See infra notes 158–169 and accompanying text. 
139 See infra notes 158–169 and accompanying text. 
140 See, e.g., DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS 
251–53 (1991) (critiquing affirmative action based on race and advocating class-based affirmative 
action); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, GETTING BEYOND RACIAL PREFERENCES: THE CLASS-BASED 
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that the system in place not only cares little for the welfare of minorities, 
and therefore works to exclude them, but also cares little for the welfare of 
poor people and excludes them as well, which limits economic diversity.
142
 
Their solution, nevertheless, seeks to include some (poor people), at the 
expense of others (people of color). This is unlike the situation in Oz, 
where the society not only cares for everyone by providing for everyone, 
but also provides for them in a way that aids and enables their inclusion 
and participation.  
A. ETHIC OF CARE: PROVIDING FOR ALL 
[T]he [E]thic[] of care is based on the universal experience . . . of 
being cared for. 




1. Ethic of Care 
The ethic of care, as developed by feminists, centers on relations 
between people and understands these relations, rather than individual 
people, to be the basis of existence.144 They suggest instead that social ties 
constitute individuals, who are relational, interdependent, and historically 
situated.145 Ultimately, an ethic of care seeks to cultivate caring relations 
between people (as well as among people and the environment and things) 
and to create the conditions for these relationships to flourish.146 
According to Virginia Held, care itself is both a ―practice and value.‖147 
―[C]are involves work and the expenditure of energy‖ by the one providing 
care.148 She explains that practices of care are multitudinous, including, for 
example, taking care of a child, bandaging a wound to avoid infection, or 
arranging food aid to families across the world.149 But all care, she notes, 
involves ―attentiveness, sensitivity and responding to needs.‖150 Caring is a 
value in and of itself, but it also revolves around a ―cluster of moral 
considerations, such as sensitivity, trust,‖ and receptivity, by which 
practices of care are evaluated.151 Nel Noddings also suggests that caring 
involves certain attitudes, such as ―[c]lose attention to the feelings, needs, 
desires, and thoughts of those cared for, and a skill in understanding a 
situation from that person‘s point of view . . . .‖152  
Held also explains that an ethic of care has four other characteristics in 
addition to seeing the individual as interdependent. These are: (1) 
―Attending to [and meeting the needs of] particular persons and actual 
                                                          
142 See supra notes 169–171. 
143 HELD, supra note 134, at 132. 
144 NODDINGS, STARTING AT HOME, supra note 136, at xiv. 
145 HELD, supra note 134, at 13–15. I remember years ago hearing a story about a frustrated music 
teacher insisting that there was no such thing as a baby, only a caretaker-baby unit. He emphasized that 
this was true because without the caretaker there would be no baby. The baby would die.  
146 NODDINGS, STARTING AT HOME, supra note 136, at xiv. 
147 HELD, supra note 134, at 39. 
148 Id. at 30. 
149 Id. at 39. 
150 Id. at 37. 
151 Id. at 38. 
152 Id. at 31(citing NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 136 at 14–19). 
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contexts in all their diversity‖; (2) valuing emotion; (3) respecting the 
claims of particular others with whom actual shared relationships exist, as 
opposed to distancing ourselves through abstract reasoning; and (4) re-
conceptualizing traditional notions about the public and private spheres.153 
Joan Tronto and Held, among others, have argued for the social and 
political applications of an ethic of care. They suggest that the aim of social 
and political institutions under such an ethic would be ―to assure ‗that all 
people are [] cared for . . . .‘‖154 Tronto notes that this is ―not a utopian 
question, but one which immediately suggests answers about employment 
policies, nondiscrimination, equalizing expenditures for schools, providing 
adequate access to health care, and so forth.‖155 Held agrees, suggesting 
that:  
[A] society that cultivates caring relations between its members 
might limit rather than expand the kinds of activities, from health 
care to child care to cultural production, that it leaves to be 
determined by the market, where individual self-interests prevails. 
And a society with well-functioning governmental practices to care 
for its members‘ needs would be able to expend far fewer of its 




2. Care and Provision in Oz 
Princess Ozma perceives and recognizes the importance of the shaggy 
man remaining shaggy. She also perceives it, however, by providing him 
new clothes that are shaggy. In doing so, Princess Ozma, representing the 
state, is operating out of the central understanding of an ethic of care, 
which is ―attending to and meeting the needs [whether physical or cultural] 
of the particular others for whom [she is taking] responsibility.‖157 The 
society, through Princess Ozma, is responding to the shaggy man‘s 
uniqueness not because it values diversity, but because it cares about 
people. 
The ethic of care in Oz is a clear, conscious position and it is 
noteworthy that so many of Oz‘s leaders are women. First, Princess Ozma 
informs the shaggy man that in Oz, people are ―loved for themselves alone, 
and for their kindness to one another, and for their good deeds.‖158 Second, 
this ethic of care shapes the way the people of Oz engage difference. 
Ozians accept and facilitate difference by providing for it. Princess Ozma is 
―pleased when she saw [the shaggy man in his new clothes] because she 
meant the shaggy man to be shaggy when she provided his new clothes.‖159 
The clothes not only fit his physical needs by covering and fitting his 
physical size and shape, but they also fit his cultural style and sense of self.  
                                                          
153 Id. at 31. 
154 Id. at 130 (quoting JOAN TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF 
CARE 145 (1993)).  
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 10. 
158 BAUM, supra note 2, at 155. 
159 Id. at 154.  
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Further, the clothes are provided even though the shaggy man is not a 
national, a citizen. Thus Oz‘s philosophy of care is not limited to only a 
select group. Everyone who exists in Oz is cared for and shares in the 
abundance of the society. Third, the ethic of care binds the shaggy man and 
limits his bid to stay in Oz. Baum notes that Princess Ozma ―decides to 
allow [the shaggy man] to live in Oz for a time, at least. If he proved honest 
and true she promised to let him live there always, and the [s]haggy [m]an 
was anxious to earn this reward.‖160 In this sense, though the shaggy man is 
seeking to immigrate to Oz, he is not required to assimilate—to become 
something or someone else.161 The ethic of care actually facilitates his 
being more fully his shaggy self, and as a philosophy, he is encouraged to 
embrace others as he has been embraced.  
The ethic of care seems imperfect, however, in some small way, even 
though it promotes relationships and, perhaps, society more generally. The 
ethic of care that binds the shaggy man‘s actions also binds the actions of 
others in a way that seems to impinge on their very being. So, for instance, 
the Hungry Tiger hungers for fat babies,162 but he does not eat them 
because his conscience will not allow him to do so.163 Said differently, he 
has been socialized in Oz to believe that it is immoral to hurt others and to 
not care for others. Thus, although the Ozians embrace all kinds of sentient 
beings and facilitate them in the fullness of themselves, their ethic of care 
limits the actions of those inclined to hurt others.  
Finally in Oz, the ethic of care also encourages abundance and the 
sharing of abundance. Like the United States, Oz has an abundance of 
resources (enough to provide the shaggy man with new shaggy clothes). 
Unlike the United States, however, Oz has a vision of both creating and 
sharing that abundance that begins and ends with the ethic of care. The 
people of Oz work only half the year and are socialized to use only what 
they need.164 That is, greed and acquisitiveness are not valued. This likely 
contributes to social abundance, feelings of having abundance, and 
maintaining that abundance. In addition, this orientation likely makes 
whatever they have easier to share. Furthermore, the ethic of care is 
complimented by a philosophy and cultivated interest on the part of 
individuals to serve others and to make others happy. As such, the 
philosophy of care allows everyone to live, and to live relatively well.  
3. Participation and Inclusion 
When the shaggy man arrives in Oz, he meets a host of strange and 
wondrous characters. All of these characters fully participate in the life of 
Oz. Baum provides a clear picture of this at Princess Ozma‘s birthday party 
celebration. In attendance at the grand banquet are all of these beings: 
I wish I could tell you how fine the company was that assembled 
that evening at Ozma‘s royal banquet. A long table was spread in 
the center of the gardening-hall of the palace and the splendor of 
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2010] Valuing Difference, Exercising Care in Oz 241 
 
the decorations and the blaze of lights and jewels 
were . . . magnificent. 
. . . .  
Santa Claus . . . was given the seat of honor at one end of the table 
while at the other end sat Princess Ozma, the hostess. 
. . . .  
At the upper end of the banquet room was a separate table provided 
for the animals. Toto sat at one end of this table with a bib tied 
around his neck and a silver platter to eat from. At the other end 
was placed a small stand, with a low rail around the edge of it, for 
Billina and her chicks. 
. . . . 
At the lower end of the great room was another table, at which sat 
the Ryls and Knooks who had come with Santa Claus [and] the 
wooden soldiers . . . .
165
 
Many of these beings approximate human beings. That is, almost all of 
them act like people and almost all are sentient beings in some narrow 
sense. This includes the talking animals, like the Cowardly Lion, the 
Hungry Tiger, Billina the Talking Chicken, and Eureka the talking kitten. It 
also includes sentient ―thing-beings,‖ such as the Scarecrow, the Tin Man, 
Jack Pumpkin Head, and the Sawhorse. But it also seems to include, to a 
lesser degree, regular animals that cannot talk, like Toto.
166
 These beings 
could be understood as sentient in that they feel pleasure and pain.
167
 
All the creatures participate in the party and in everyday life, as does 
the shaggy man, a person who is not originally from Oz. One might argue, 
however, that there is some rank order in their participation and that 
humanness, at lease in physical form, constitutes a hidden norm. Consider 
that all the animals, whether they can talk or not, sit at one table in the 
banquet hall while many of the other human-like creatures sit at the table 
with Princess Ozma.
168
 Further, there is the question of the palace servants 
who presumably attend the party but are working. In this sense, even the 
Land of Oz is not perfect though its practices of diversity are both richer 
and deeper.  
In addition, however, their differences are noticed and provided for, for 
the purpose of enabling their participation. So, for instance, the shaggy man 
is made comfortable with fine clothes that, like he, are shaggy. Toto is 
provided a plate to eat off of, while Billina and her chicks are placed in a 
stand with a rail around to keep them safe. Being attentive to their specific 
needs enables their participation in the day and the day is grand.  
In the end, the shaggy man appears to earn his reward of staying in Oz 
when he and others face almost certain death. Embracing the ethic of care, 
participating in the life of the country, the shaggy man decides to stay with 
                                                          
165 BAUM, supra note 2, at 261. 
166 Toto is also seated at the table with his bib. Id. at 161. 
167 MERRIAM-WEBSTER‘S DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004) defines sentient as responsive to or conscious of 
sense perceptions.  
168 See id. at 261. 
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Princess Ozma who refuses to hurt those who are attacking Oz, intent on its 
destruction. 
B. INTERLOCKING DIFFERENCES OF RACE AND CLASS 
Those who argue for class-related considerations in decision-making 
(as opposed to racial considerations) in reaction to Justice O‘Connor‘s 
Grutter v. Bollinger opinion may well sense that not only is economic 
diversity lacking in too many places, but that also, in fact, elite schools, 
among other institutions, do not care about including poor people—they do 
not care about them, do not adequately provide for them, and therefore do 
not enable their participation. For instance, most students who drop out of 
school do so because they must work.169 Scholars who argue for class based 
consideration may sense that the society cares about, and provides more 
opportunities to, minorities.170 Other scholars may believe that if class 
considerations are used, minorities will be included (although this has been 
shown not to be the case).
171
 Still others may think that racial issues will 
disappear if the society moves toward a social democratic order, whereby 
all people have access to the necessities of life.  
They all may be on to something. However, their insights are limited in 
several significant ways. The problem of exclusion is much deeper than the 
first two critiques allow. A significant part of the problem is in the 
provision and distribution (as well as production) of resources—in 
economic relations and class. But even these revolve around racial identity, 
where the society is supposedly organized to care for some at the expense 
of others, but in reality society cares for very few. 
First, the idea that class considerations should replace racial ones 
entails a rather superficial understanding of the mechanisms that limit poor 
people‘s access to resources, including resources such as admission to elite 
schools. The problem of accessing educational opportunities lies not with 
the admission of students of color (who take ―white places‖) but with the 
                                                          
169 Held notes that in the issue of elite schools and the poor, there is a difference between caring or 
exercising care and ―caring about‖ something. See, eg., Reactions: Is It Time for Class-Based 
Affirmative Action?, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 16, 2009), 
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2003, available at http://diverseeducation.com/article/3029/ (discussing among other things, a report 
―commissioned by the Century Foundation entitled ‗Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity and 
Selective College Admissions‘‖ that found that ―at the most selective 146 colleges and universities 3 
percent of the undergraduates at those schools are from families in the bottom quartile for 
socioeconomic status and 10 percent are from the bottom half. Though Blacks and Latinos were 28 
percent of all 18 year olds in 1995, they represent only 12 percent of the freshmen students attending 
the top 146 colleges, according to the report.‖ Dr. Anthony P. Carnevale, one of the authors of the report 
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decrease in Black and Latino representation at the top 146 schools, "we'd be going backwards."); 
SCHMIDT, supra note 96. The text could be read as implying such an argument. 
171 See Reactions: Is It Time for Class-Based Affirmative Action?, supra note 169; Roach, supra note 
170. 
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maldistribution of resources that allow the few to monopolize such 
resources at the expense of the many. That is, both people of color and less 
affluent whites often lack adequate resources to meet their needs. In the 
context of higher education, less affluent whites often cannot afford the 
preparatory tools that render admission accessible.172 That is, the problem is 
not that they cannot afford to attend these institutions, a problem that 
financial aid is supposed to fix. But rather, it is that they do not have 
enough money to prepare at the level that will even allow them to gain 
admission in the first instance.173 In other words, the construction of merit 
is very much related to access and to money,174 and not unrelated to race. 
Although white supremacy theoretically allows all whites to participate 
fully in everyday life, historically trying to limit the access to schools to 
those considered white enough, white elites designed tests that screened out 
those too new to the country and those too poor from accessing the 
information that might make passing entrance tests possible.175 The effect 
of those policies even today, in the current post-civil rights period, the third 
period of this racial order, is that many minorities and poor people of all 
sorts cannot access a good education. This then impacts their access to 
good jobs and the cycle of exclusion begins anew. 
Second, the conversation about class in the higher education context is 
often distorted by race, such that talk about class is really a conversation 
about white racial privilege.
176
 In other words, class is a proxy for 
whiteness in which the hidden refrain is that people of color should not take 
the places to which whites are entitled. Or, all whites should be 
accommodated and have access to social goods before any people of color. 
Although these statements are publicly qualified with the idea that 
unqualified people of color should not take the place of qualified whites, 
both the intent and result are the same. Whites are presumed qualified, 
people of color are not, and whites then should be admitted to schools over, 
and instead of, people of color. It rarely occurs to anyone that in some elite 
institutions the only economic diversity that exists results from the 
admission of minorities,177 or that efforts that seek to exclude colored 
people also often work to exclude poor whites. Consider the case of voting. 
In order to limit blacks‘ voting rights, white supremacists did not simply 
block blacks from voting, they established literaracy rules and poll taxes 
that had the effect of not just simply blocking blacks' access, but also 
keeping poor white people from voting and participating.178 
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This is not to say that poor whites and people of color are situated the 
same. They are not.179 But it is to say that ―although race and social class 
are conceptually separate,‖180 they are, in social practice, always 
intertwined.181 Capitalism began the process of marking and demarcating 
peoples as races,182 but it was the exploitation of people of color and their 
vast resources that made global capitalism work. That is, capitalism 
underwrote race, but race also underpinned capitalism. As Minkah 
Makalani, in rejecting the position that pursuing socialism first would lead 
to the liberation of people of color, points out:  
‗[T]he national liberation of India was central to breaking down the 
British Empire and capitalism.‘ In contrast to the notion that 
socialist revolution would lead automatically to the liberation of 
the colonies as Engels had argued in 1882, [others] held that it was 
the existence of the colonies in Asia and Africa which allowed the 
imperialist bourgeoisie to maintain social control over workers in 
the metropole, and that it would not therefore be possible to 
overthrow the capitalist system in Europe without the breaking up 
of the colonial empire. . . . [This] . . . placed the liberation of Africa 
and Asia (and . . . Blacks in the U.S.
183




Further, ―the social classes under capitalism have always been differentially 
distributed among the populations of the earth on the basis of the 
coloniality of power . . . .‖185 Certain classes have existed ―in the Euro-
core‖ and similar, but additional, classes, including slaves and serfs, have 
existed in the periphery.186 Anibal Quijano suggests that it has been 
―precisely this set of power relations that has allowed the capitalists to 
shape and finance the loyalty of the exploited or dominated whites against 
the other ‗races.‘‖187 W.E.B. Du Bois is even clearer in situating dominated 
white workers in relation to people of color and demonstrating the ways in 
which class and race are intertwined.
188
 He suggested ―workers of color 
were the true proletariat of the world-system, while white workers occupied 
an intermediate position in the world division of labor. The psychological 
sop of racism undermined the commitment to equality among white 
                                                          
179 See John A. Powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785 (2009) 
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to social goods).  
180 BUSH, supra note 81, at 90.  
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188 BUSH, supra at note 81, at 93. 
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workers, who instead guarded their position of relative privilege, acting as 
police over ‗niggers.‘‖189 
It is this differential in social class between whites and people of color 
that all too often renders the third idea—a quick transition to some sort of 
social democratic order, which could end all our problems—merely wishful 
thinking. The idea is that if there is more social provisioning of goods, such 
as health care, food, housing, childcare, etc., and these are more equally 
distributed, as in Oz, then racial oppression will be eliminated. It will be 
eliminated in part because the material basis that supports the ideology of 
white entitlement, poverty among people of color and segregation, will 
disappear, and therefore the ideology itself will also disappear. In such a 
society perhaps everyone would go to a good school.  
The problem with this idea is two-fold. First, as Noddings notes, 
Americans dread communism even though they have not sorted or adapted 
the current worth of the idea and they have an uncritical acceptance that 
competition, whether moderate or extreme, is good.190 Second, race—
which has become a semi-autonomous system—and in particular, white 
racial positioning, hinders movement toward more social cooperation and 
provision of goods and services, like universal health care. This is because 
whites fear that blacks, other people of color, and immigrants, will 
somehow get something that they do not deserve, or will get more than 
they.
191
 Whites do so, in part, because they participate and live in a system 
where often their own needs are barely met.
192
 They figure—buying into 
capitalist white supremacist ideologies—that it is better for no one to get 
anything, rather than for whites to lose out. If they, however, can be 
guaranteed first dibs, or better yet, guaranteed to get something, while 
people of color get little or nothing at all, then their opposition decreases, 
as did Southern Democrats‘ opposition to New Deal policies once the 
majority of black workers were precluded from benefiting under them
193
. 
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This of course suits white capitalists just fine, in part because often 
they are deeply racist and in part because while proclaiming allegiance to 
liberty and freedom, they do not want anyone other than themselves to be 
liberated and free from want. They recognize that ―a person who has 
nothing can be made to do anything,‖194 and such people can be coerced to 
work for pennies and contribute to profits, which makes capitalism go 
round. And so elites feather the bed of an ideology that says you keep what 
you accumulate—no matter how you accumulate it—and only the smart, 
talented, and lucky are rich. This justifies their own positions and allows 
them to continue to ensure that the rules favor their preservation. In this 
way, white supremacy and capitalism walk hand in hand. To get rid of one, 
it is almost certain that you have to get rid of the other or severely curtail 
both their operations. Said differently, accepting and providing for all in 
ways that enable their participation or promoting both those marked as 
racially different and poor may be a way out. 
V. CONCLUSION: CARING, SHARING, AND BEING 
OURSELVES 
There is a stark difference between Oz and the United States. In Oz, the 
people value difference not out of a theory of difference and diversity, but 
rather out of an ethic of care. In Oz, people care about beings. They 
recognize and respect differences in these living beings, they accommodate 
and respond to these differences, and they provide for them. In the United 
States, by contrast, there is a lot of talk about difference and diversity. But 
the society either oppresses difference—or those considered different—for 
the purposes of elevating some and not others, or the society attempts to 
ignore difference, which given society‘s organization, becomes another tool 
of oppression. 
Given the preceding dreary picture, How might we get out of this mess 
and how might we better engage difference and deepen our practices of 
diversity? That is, How do we get from where we are to where Oz is? Of 
course, if the answer to this question were easy, both in conception and 
implementation, somebody else would have already thought of it! But 
continuing with the exploration of Oz, the shaggy man‘s story in Oz 
suggests that we move toward caring and sharing and being ourselves. And 
though this sounds rather ―mamby pamby,‖ this is no easy task. Instead, it 
is a fight—one, in some ways, in which we are already engaged. 
First, to move toward an ethic of care, most of us would have to learn a 
great deal more about what constitutes an ethic of care, and likely 
participate in further developing it in ourselves and others. Then we would 
have to really evaluate and potentially restructure our relations to ensure 
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that we provide care, attentively and concretely, for those with whom we 
are in relation.  
Past the private sphere, however, scholars such as Held and Noddings 
have already provided some indication as to what commitments to an ethic 
of care might be required at the social level. These include such things as a 
focus on ensuring that all children flourish, universal health care, housing, 
and a host of activities and other pursuits in which many of us are already 
involved. Even so, we would need to reevaluate these activities and 
relationships as well. As Tronto suggests, more definitive answers to some 
of our most vexing questions, including resource questions, might be found 
once we begin moving toward an ethic of care.  
However, the struggle over the recently enacted healthcare insurance 
bill
195
 provides some clues as to the kind of struggle and the nature of the 
forces arrayed against efforts that seek to render all manner of people less 
desperate and which would require access to the United States‘ vast 
resources, access which only the few have. Trying to engage and dialogue 
through an ethic of care might spur more listening and engagement, but 
these sorts of ideas and measures are likely to engender resistance from the 
powerful, and vulnerable alike, for reasons already discussed.  
Similarly, a move toward a philosophy of sharing such as the one in 
Oz, which operates from the standpoint of felt abundance and sharing, is 
likely to generate conversations and reevaluations of a host of issues such 
as scarcity, land use, production, executive pay, abundance, and other fiscal 
priorities and issues. Foreshadowed by a move toward an ethic of care, 
which involves social provision, the idea again would be to align the issues 
with intentions and plans that would ―assure all people are cared for.‖ This 
kind of movement is sure to garner fierce opposition and debate. But this is 
necessary work. In fact, success around these kinds of efforts, piece by 
piece, might lay a better foundation for our engagement with difference. 
But our engagement with difference must proceed simultaneously. 
While we are advocating for economic care (empowerment) for all, we 
should ensure that the specific care needs of those perceived, structured, or 
those who have chosen to be different, are attended to and met. This is 
important because we know ―universal‖ benefits have not always been 
universal. In this sense, the issue in Grutter v. Bollinger should likely not 
be race or class, but rather race and class, a situation which will make a 
small dent. Further, struggles about resource allocation inevitably bring out 
struggles about race, immigration status, and other differences, usually in a 
negative way. Thus, like the shaggy man, people of color, whether finely 
dressed or not, would do well to be themselves. That is, they should tell 
their stories, write their history, raise their children in relation to themselves 
and the communities around them, and act with others. They should 
perhaps do this from an ethic of care, informed by a jazz aesthetic and the 
injunction of love that Martin Luther King, Jr. taught, using the tools of 
their own consciousness, their own sight, to see the hidden norms, 
structures, exercises of power, and missteps, which do them harm. 
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